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Toward the Omniscient Maker of  Tales:  
The Dynamics of  the Self  and the Whole  
in the Early Thought of  Mikhail Bakhtin  
 
DUŠAN RADUNOVIĆ 
UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE 
                              
There is the old English story of the 
dialogue between John and Thomas, in 
which it is always John’s John talking, and 
Thomas’ Thomas; for John speaks only to 
John’s Thomas, and Thomas only to 
Thomas’ John, while the real John, the real 
Thomas, and the whole tale of their 
conversation can be seen and heard only by 
their omniscient Maker. And this, alas, is 
something more than a poor jest, for it is 
pretty nearly the literal truth. 
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy 
 
It may be doubted whether this philosophical joke cited by 
Max Scheler in his Nature of Sympathy1 effectively exemplifies Scheler’s 
own position, but what is certain is that it epitomizes the basic 
concern of the early thought of Mikhail Bakhtin. Indeed, Bakhtin’s 
early assessment of the dynamic of self and other informed everything 
he did afterwards; all his later concepts and elaborations bear witness 
to the early focus of his investigations—the profound and vibrant 
intersection of ethics, aesthetics, and religion.  All of Bakhtin’s “great 
narratives” are to a significant extent related to the central issue of his 
early philosophical anthropology—the position of the human subject 
in its highly interdependent environment, the latter understood as a 
meticulously structured volitional network of the subject’s relationship 
both to other persons and to material creation. 
All the modal transformations of Bakhtin’s thought (from 
ethics to linguistics, from the concept of polyphony to the notion of 
the text) share the following essential dynamic: every concept is 
(explicitly or obliquely) set in an architectonics which has its own 
personalized axiological axis—that of the non-indifferent human 
being. It is my contention that this ethically founded architectonics of 
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being should not be viewed in exclusively moral terms, but also in the 
context of Bakhtin’s fundamentally holistic worldview. To explicate 
the dominantas of young Bakhtin’s thought, as well as to reassert their 
formative importance for his later work, I shall discuss several of his 
early texts: “Art and Answerability,” Toward a Philosophy of the Act, 
“Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,” and “The Problem of 
Content, Material and Form.” I will not be juxtaposing Bakhtin’s ideas 
with recognizable socio-cultural models; rather, I will be discussing 
the relevance of his early concepts within the wider context of a “life 
ideology,”2 with an emphasis on his holistic view of the differentiating 
world.  
Since the text’s publication in 1986, the significance of 
Bakhtin’s first ambitious treatise, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, has 
transcended the perimeter of intra-Bakhtinian studies. There is now a 
consensus that this text, initially perceived as a treatise on ethics, has a 
much broader scope. Toward a Philosophy of the Act is a truly multi-
faceted work; a daring reassessment of Western ontology, it also 
elaborates an idiosyncratic evaluative theory, offers some penetrating 
instances of literary criticism, and engages in subtle theological 
deliberations. 
The philosophical intention of the treatise follows two 
distinctly separate, yet related, trajectories: a primary ethical demand 
for a non-indifferent, responsible subject, and a derivative, but equally 
important, authorial imperative for unity and wholesomeness.3 The 
ethical intention of the treatise is manifest in Bakhtin’s search for the 
roots of responsibility. In this search, he modifies slightly the third 
postulate of Kant’s Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, which 
enjoins the moral subject to make a free choice betwen good and evil.4 
Positing the notion of responsibility (not to be equated with 
answerability) as fundamental to his ethics, Bakhtin seems to leave the 
subject’s position negotiable, postulating that there is no other 
imperative for a person to act but responsibility itself. The only 
motivation for responsibility to become manifest and trigger the act 
lies in the uniqueness of the subject’s  position in the world:  
I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is 
unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot be 
taken by anyone else. . . . In the given once-occurrent 
point where I am now located in the once-occurrent 
time and once-occurrent space of once occurrent 
Being. . . . That which can be done by me can never be 
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done by anyone else. The uniqueness or singularity of 
present-on-hand Being is compellently obligatory. 
(Bakhtin, Philosophy 40)5  
Bakhtin distances himself from both formal and material ethics: what 
makes me a responisble being comes from the sphere of real life, real 
existence. My responsibility is not conditioned by any kind of 
imperative, or by the content of the good itself, no matter how 
indisputable this content may be. This non-conditional stance on 
Bakhtin’s part does not presuppose relativism. Rather, it relies on the 
proposition that, if I am a responsible being, I am not to have 
recourse to any type of “alibi in Being.” The reason I am not allowed 
to have an “alibi in Being” is my irreplaceable position in Being:  
It is this affirmation of my non-alibi in Being that constitutes 
the basis of my life being actually and completely given 
as well as its being actually and completely projected as 
something-yet-to-be-achieved. It is only my non-alibi in 
Being that transforms an empty possibility into an 
actual answerable act or deed. (Bakhtin, Philosophy 42) 
If we follow the logical unfolding of Bakhtin’s argumentation in the 
treatise, we can perceive the true hierarchy of his philosophical 
propositions. The subject’s responsibility is, undoubtedly, the core of 
Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act, but the ultimate horizon of his ethical 
project is in the (personalized) overcoming of the “fundamental split“ 
in the totality of human culture—the split between the given “world 
of culture” and the actual “world of life.” In other words, Bakhtin’s 
deep agenda is holistic. Although the treatise might be seen as focused 
solely on individual ethics, the climactic meaning of individual action, 
as Bakhtin sees it, resides in the individual’s partaking of the Being-as-
Event (a participation that is, at the same time, a founding act). The 
subject’s ultimate (i.e., ownmost) activity—the validation of his/her 
existence—is seen not in terms of concrete social practice, but as an 
“entering-the-communion” (in Russian, “priobshchenie,” which 
means, literally, “entering a unity”). This unity, which appears as the 
moral act’s final aim, constitutes the aforementioned holistic world:  
At the basis of an actual deed is a being-in-communion 
with the once-occurent unity; what is answerable does 
not dissolve in what is specialized (politics), otherwise 
what we have is not an answerable deed but a technical 
or instrumental action” (Bakhtin, Philosophy 42; 
emphasis added).6 
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The same ethical stance profoundly informs Bakhtin’s 
approach to culture. Thus, in “The Problem of Content,” Bakhtin 
brings his holistic view to bear on the assessment of contemporary 
poetics. His main objection to the Russian Formalists does not 
concern their effort to explore literature on scientific grounds 
(Bakhtin was an advocate of an aesthetic reevaluation of literature), 
but their method of achieving “literary scientificity” by isolating 
literature from the wholeness of human culture. Maintaining that 
every word in literature is inscribed with layers of social and cultural 
usages non-indifferent to us, he situates the realm of aesthetics inside 
the grid of human culture.7 The key difference between the material 
object of art, as conceptualized by the Russian Formalists, and the 
aesthetic object in Bakhtin’s understanding, is that the latter 
participates in (and is constituted by) a network of connections to the 
socio-cultural and cognitive environment. 
The basic feature of the aesthetic that sharply 
distinguishes it from cognition and performed action 
is its receptive, positively accepting character, which 
enters into the work (or, to be exact, into the aesthetic 
object) and there becomes an indispensable 
constitutive moment. In this sense, we can say that in 
actuality life is found not only outside art but in it, 
within it, in all the fullness of its value-bearing 
weightiness—social, political, cognitive, and so on. 
(Bakhtin, “Problem” 278) 
This leads Bakhtin to the firm belief that no sphere of human 
existence is detached from its environment. Every reductionism (i.e., 
any specialization of disciplines), especially if applied to the 
humanities,8 exacts Bakhtin’s disapproval: he denounces any 
mechanistic transposition of positivist patterns of thinking into the 
domain of humanistic studies. When considering the verbal arts and 
culture, Bakhtin’s position is as comprehensive as it is straightforward: 
in his creative activity, the verbal artist never deals with intact and 
neutral material; the world he encounters has been already 
evaluated—practically (in Bakhtin, cognition and ethics necessarily 
precede aesthetics), as well as aesthetically (in other works of 
literature):  
Besides the reality of both cognition and performed 
action, the artist of the word also finds literature to be 
already on hand: it is necessary for him to fight against 
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or for old literary forms, to make use of them, to com-
bine them, to overcome their resistance or to find sup-
port in them. But, at the heart of all this movement 
and struggle within the bounds of purely literary con-
text, there is a more essential, determining primary 
struggle with the reality of action and cognition. . . . 
(Bakhtin, “Problem” 284)9 
I have already mentioned the importance of the axiological sphere for 
the constitution of the subject in Bakhtin. In the living subject, 
axiological activity and existence overlap without a remainder: since 
existing means being responsible, the subject, insofar as s/he exists, is 
always evaluating and being evaluated. Here, we should distinguish 
between the notion of evaluation in early Bakhtin and a more habitual 
understanding of criticism. From Bakhtin’s perspective, the subject’s 
evaluative activity is an emotional-volitional act directed at the outside 
world, the acknowledgement of his/her affinity with the world’s being 
(Philosophy 33-34). The recognition of what is outside the subject 
brings a new recuperation of the world, neither solely axiological nor 
moral, in a narrow sense, but holistically accented. On its ulitmate 
(perhaps, utopian) horizon, this recuperation becomes the creative-
dynamic redemption of the world, at the center of which stands the 
non-indifferent subject, the subject that is, eo ipso, expected to act, 
making his surroundings into the world-in-becoming, the world as a 
permanent, interdependently ongoing Event. Significantly, Bakhtin 
introduces eminently theological terminology in order to describe the 
relationship between the subject and the world. The balance between 
the subject’s self-affirmation and his/her disappearance in Being is 
understood as a unity “without confusion, without separation”: “My 
active deed . . . is not simply an affirmation of myself or simply an 
affirmation of actual Being, but a non-fused yet undivided affirmation 
of myself in Being. . . .” (Bakhtin, Philosophy 41).  
Let us now return from the world endowed with evaluative 
creativity to its “prime mover”: the inner world of the responsible 
subject. The constitution of this ethical (and, thus, also aesthetic) 
entity is highly dependent upon the act of crossing-over, extending 
over a boundary. The interrelated concepts of “boundary” and the 
“boundless” are absolutely integral to Bakhtin’s vision of the world as 
both a realm of moral action and a domain of culture. In Toward a 
Philosophy of the Act, we read:  
[My] actually performed act on the basis of my non-
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alibi in Being . . . is actually set into immediate 
proximity to the ultimate bounds of Being as 
event. . . . However full of content might be or 
however concrete and individual a deed might be, in 
their small yet actual domain they participate in the 
boundless whole. (54)  
In “The Problem of Content” Bakhtin discusses the sphere of culture 
in similar terms: 
A cultural domain has no inner territory. It is located 
entirely upon boundaries, boundaries intersect it 
everywhere, passing through each of its constituent 
features. The systematic unity of culture passes into 
the atoms of cultural life. . . . Every cultural act lives 
essentially on the boundaries. . . . Separated by 
abstraction from these boundaries, it loses the ground 
of its being and becomes vacuous, arrogant; it 
degenerates and dies. 
In this sense, we can speak about the concrete 
systematicness of every cultural phenomenon, of every 
individual cultural act, about its autonomous participation 
or its participative autonomy (274; emphasis in the origi-
nal). 
Bakhtin challenges the essentially static notion of identity 
characteristic of Western thinking, classical as well as modern. In the 
artistic act, no less than in the ethical act, the subject resides in that 
movement through which s/he extends over the boundaries of his/
her identity. With this notorious application of the Husserlian 
dialectics of “horizon” and “surroundings,” Bakhtin was among the 
first in Western culture to attend (however idiosyncratically) to a 
number of delicate issues: the interrelationship between a fractal and a 
whole, between the individual and the social, and—what is of 
exceptional importance for his understanding of culture—between 
different series within a (social or any other) whole.10  
In his late fragments, dealing with the imperative for 
“exactness” in the humanities, Bakhtin returns to the issue of the 
boundary:   
Each word (each sign) of the text exceeds its 
boundaries. Any understanding is a correlation of a 
given text with other texts. . .   [Philosophy] begins 
where precise science ends and a different science begins. 
14 STUDIES IN SLAVIC CULTURES  
alibi in Being . . . is actually set into immediate 
proximity to the ultimate bounds of Being as 
event. . . . However full of content might be or 
however concrete and individual a deed might be, in 
their small yet actual domain they participate in the 
boundless whole. (54)  
In “The Problem of Content” Bakhtin discusses the sphere of culture 
in similar terms: 
A cultural domain has no inner territory. It is located 
entirely upon boundaries, boundaries intersect it 
everywhere, passing through each of its constituent 
features. The systematic unity of culture passes into 
the atoms of cultural life. . . . Every cultural act lives 
essentially on the boundaries. . . . Separated by 
abstraction from these boundaries, it loses the ground 
of its being and becomes vacuous, arrogant; it 
degenerates and dies. 
In this sense, we can speak about the concrete 
systematicness of every cultural phenomenon, of every 
individual cultural act, about its autonomous participation 
or its participative autonomy (274; emphasis in the origi-
nal). 
Bakhtin challenges the essentially static notion of identity 
characteristic of Western thinking, classical as well as modern. In the 
artistic act, no less than in the ethical act, the subject resides in that 
movement through which s/he extends over the boundaries of his/
her identity. With this notorious application of the Husserlian 
dialectics of “horizon” and “surroundings,” Bakhtin was among the 
first in Western culture to attend (however idiosyncratically) to a 
number of delicate issues: the interrelationship between a fractal and a 
whole, between the individual and the social, and—what is of 
exceptional importance for his understanding of culture—between 
different series within a (social or any other) whole.10  
In his late fragments, dealing with the imperative for 
“exactness” in the humanities, Bakhtin returns to the issue of the 
boundary:   
Each word (each sign) of the text exceeds its 
boundaries. Any understanding is a correlation of a 
given text with other texts. . .   [Philosophy] begins 
where precise science ends and a different science begins. 
BAKHTIN 15 
It can be defined as the metalanguage of all sciences 
(and of all kinds of cognition and consciousness). 
(“Methodology” 161; emphasis added).  
The “exactness” or, rather, “precision,” found in philosophy and 
other humanitarian disciplines is, according to Bakhtin, inherently 
different from the one mandated by the so-called “exact” sciences. 
The point at which the former diverge from the latter is the deeply 
humanistic imperative for “surmounting the otherness of the other 
without transforming him/her into purely one’s 
own” (“Methodology” 170). The same possibility holds for the other 
end of the duality: the “I” could transcend its selfhood without losing 
its subjectivity. Bakhtin’s subject thus dwells on the borderline 
between the self and the outer world, constituted in a union “without 
confusion, without separation.”11  
 With the term “outsideness” (or, “being-outside,” exotopy),12 
Bakhtin strives to convey precisely this displaced—in relation to its 
perceived boundaries—being of the subject. The displacement is 
made manifest, once again, as Bakhtin theorizes the dynamic between 
literary author and hero. There is an inherent discrepancy between the 
levels occupied by these two personae—the “inside” of the hero and 
the “outside” of the author: the author is in possession of a surplus of 
evaluative consciousness, by means of which he is able to finalize the 
hero. For Bakhtin, the seizure of any value, its finalization as value 
proper, always comes from the outside; evaluative self-consciousness, 
a proper apprehension of one’s own values is, strictly speaking, 
impossible, it is a contradiction in terms.13 The individual ethical act, 
as we have seen, is grounded in the subject’s recognition of a being 
outside his/her self. In the architectonics of artistic creation, this 
being-outside is embodied by the author: 
The aesthetic subiectum’s (the author’s, the 
contemplator’s) unique place in Being, the point from 
which his aesthetic activity (his objective love of a 
concrete human being) starts out or issues, has only 
one determination: his being situated outside all of the 
moments in the architectonic unity of aesthetic seeing. 
And it is this that for the first time creates the 
possibility for the aesthetic subiectum to encompass the 
entire spatial as well as temporal architectonic through 
the action of a valuatively unitary affirming and 
founding self-activity. (Bakhtin, Philosophy 66-67; em-
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phasis in the original) 
Bakhtin widens and enriches the Husserlian concept of the self with 
his own, “Chalcedonian,” formulation14: the whole of human creative 
activity (cognitive as well as artistic) may be seen as a dialectical move 
back and forth—from (seemingly) “losing” one’s self to regaining it in 
an interaction with the other and with the world as creation.  
A further elaboration of the “Bakhtinian self” appears almost 
simultaneously with “The Author and Hero” in the “Leningrad 
Lectures” of 1924-25. There, Bakhtin reassesses Kant’s philosophy of 
the subject, distancing himself from Kant’s “logic of the horizon,” 
which stipulates that everything one perceives is determined and 
delimited solely by the subject’s own position/perspective. Bakhtin 
endorses Kant’s claim that “one judgment has its life only within the 
system of other judgments,” but criticizes the “relativization” of the 
self in the first Critique, where space and time are posited as categories 
prior to any experience: “Kant is constantly on the verge of a 
presentation of space as an object . . . the space of the horizon. [All] 
he has is the logic of the horizon, i.e., of the subiectum” (“Lectures” 
216; emphasis in the original).  
Dissatisfied with Kant, Bakhtin finds philosophical 
consolation in Max Scheler’s On the Nature of Sympathy. Scheler’s 
endeavor in this book is to establish the idea of the Other as an a 
priori, i.e., as an idea that exists and can be intuited independently of 
experience. In order to demonstrate this, Scheler conceives his own 
“epistemological Robinson Crusoe,” arguing that even if such a 
Robinson has never come into contact with beings of his kind and has 
no evidence of their existence, he would nevertheless intuit their 
existence by certain epistemological or emotional “blanks,” by 
experiencing of the lack of response that his actions engender:  
From these necessarily specific and unmistakable 
blanks . . . where his intentional actions miss their 
mark, he would . . . derive a most positive intuition 
and idea of something present to him as the sphere of the 
Thou, of which he is merely unacquainted with any particular 
instance. (Scheler 235; emphasis in the original) 
However, Scheler was aware that the existence of the Other cannot be 
ascertained if we remain within the cognitive procedures of pure logic 
(for instance, its analogical thinking), or if we “confine” the other 
inside the sphere of our emotions. In neither case does the Other exist 
as a category/entity in itself. Only when one addresses the issue on 
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the ontological level, can one hope to approach the comprehension of 
this dynamic. 
These insights of Scheler’s were likely the most influential for 
the early years of Bakhtin’s philosophical apprenticeship. They 
provided a strong encouragement for young Bakhtin’s pursuit of the 
appropriate idea of the subject. Scheler’s concluding observation that 
“the primary awareness . . . consists of patterns of wholeness” (264;  em-
phasis in the original) influenced the birth of Bakhtin’s dialogical 
subject, that paradoxical holistic and differentiating entity, 
characterized by a post-romantic concern for the Other, and, as such, 
carrying this Other within itself.  
I shall end here, at the point where Bakhtin’s great dialogic 
narrative begins. A scrupulous voyage through different notions of the 
self, all of them dependent upon certain a priori relationships of the 
subject (Kant’s theory of time and space as a priori preconditions for 
human cognition, Husserl’s notions of horizon and surroundings, the 
Patristic/Chalcedonian dialectics of “divided unity,” and Scheler’s 
postulation of the idea of the other a priori), enabled Bakhtin to 
formulate his own inventive idea of the subject. Armed with this idea, 
he maps the field of his moral philosophy outside the limits of the 
subject’s mind, postulates the concept of aesthetic consummation, and 
defines literature and culture as an interpenetrating whole. It is my 
belief that Bakhtin’s (seemingly paradoxical) vision of a whole infused 
with differentiation can prove extremely valuable today. In the same 
daring way in which it challenged immovable metaphysical 
conceptions of the human being inherited from the past, it can also 
provide us with a genuine alternative to some of the self-annihilating 
conclusions of the postmodern philosophical and sociological critique. 
 
Notes 
1. Scheler borrows the passage from O. W. Holmes’s The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table.  
2. On Bakhtin’s notion of “zhiznennaia ideologiia” see Voloshinov  424-28. 
3. The second aspect has not yet been given sufficient attention in Bakhtin scholar-
ship. As I will argue further, the search for the whole and the wholesome is an es-
sential characteristic of Bakhtin’s thought. 
4. See Nielsen 94. 
5. Thus conceived, the notion of “activity” does not appear to have much political 
potential: indeed, the human capacity that Bakhtin is primarily addressing here is the 
subject’s will. In terms of Bakhtin’s ethics of the will, “coming out of the responsi-
bility,” which is the realm of theory, is inseparable from “inciting an act,” the realm 
of practice: responsible volitional attitude toward the world is moral activity par excel-
lence.  
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6. Here I give preference to “entering the communion” instead of the rather static, as 
if already finalized, “being in communion.” 
7. Where the domain of culture is understood as a network of mutually related acts of 
human creation, not limited to the artistic sphere. 
8. In Toward a Philosophy of the Act this ethically based argumentation concerns the 
spheres of the natural sciences and technology, whereas in later fragments on episte-
mology Bakhtin distinguishes between the human sciences and the broad category of 
“exact knowledge” (Cf. Bakhtin, “Methodology” 160 et passim). 
9. Bakhtin faults the Russian Formalists for overvaluing the artistic device and turning 
it into a self-sufficient principle of the creative processes.  
10. It may be argued that the irreconcilable philosophical disagreement between   
Bakhtin and the Russian Formalists is to be found precisely at this point. While the 
isolation of a series is a cornerstone in the methodology of early Formalism, for Bak-
htin such an isolation is unacceptable; he sees it as one of the reductionisms endemic 
to abstract theoretical thinking: “The isolated sense/meaning is contradictio in ad-
jecto” (“Problem” 260). 
11. The oxymoronic phrase “nesliianno i nerazdel'no” captures the most essential intui-
tion of Bakhtin’s critical genius—the penchant for thinking difference-in-unity and 
unity-in-difference. This intuition was to inform his entire oeuvre: from the concept 
of polyphony to the theory of the utterance and the epistemology of the human sci-
ences. (For Bakhtin’s rendering of “asynhytōs, atreptōs, adiairetōs, ahoristōs,” the famous 
formulation of Christ’s twofold nature canonized by the Fourth Ecumenical Council 
in Chalcedon in 451, see Mihailovic 125-48 and Lock 100 et passim.) 
12. The Russian term Bakhtin uses is the neologism “vnenakhodimost'.” 
13. In “Lectures and Comments of 1924-1925,” Bakhtin uses as an example the New 
Testament parable of the Publican and the Pharisee (Luke 18.9-14). The Pharisee 
“incarnate[s] the position of the Third” (which is the transcendental position), and 
justifies himself in legal terms, whereas the Publican remains “unfinalized” in terms 
of a formal religion and thus open for the finalizing act of true religious salvation. 
Among his fragments from the 1940s, we find more of Bakhtin’s meditations on 
self-evaluation: “My body, my face; such feelings I can only usurp from the 
other” (Bakhtin, Sobranie 73; my translation). 
 14. See endnote 11 
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